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Resumen
Este estudio proporciona estimaciones cientí-
ficas de los ingresos anuales generados por la 
industria ilícita de la cocaína en Colombia (1991-
2007), a partir de los datos sobre la producción 
de coca recogidos por la Oficina de las Naciones 
Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito. Mientras 
los productores colombianos reciben solo una 
fracción de los ingresos globales de tráfico de co-
caína y de las ventas, el control de la producción 
y la apropiación de los ingresos están altamente 
concentrados, lo que señala la gran capacidad de 
las empresas de drogas ilícitas para afectar a la 
economía y sociedad colombiana. Comparamos 
narco-acumulación de capital en el contexto más 
amplio de la economía colombiana en términos 
de productividad, pautas de empleo, crecimien-
to, concentración de la riqueza y poder. Así, la 
Abstract 
This study provides up-to-date scientific estima-
tes of annual revenues generated by Colombia’s 
illicit cocaine industry (1991-2007), imputed 
from data on coca production collected by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
While Colombian producers appropriate only 
a fraction of global revenues from cocaine 
trafficking and sales, control over production 
and appropriation of revenues is highly con-
centrated, suggesting a great capacity for illegal 
drug-firms to impact Colombian economy and 
society. We compare narco-capital accumula-
tion within the wider context of the Colombian 
economy in terms of productivity, employment 
patterns, growth and concentration of wealth 
and power and find that narco-production ranks 
among the most productive and lucrative sec-
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producción de estupefacientes es uno de los más 
productivos y lucrativos sectores de la econo-
mía. Si bien el potencial de ganancias es alto, la 
naturaleza ilegal de la industria —las empresas 
son propensas a la violencia y el sabotaje de los 
competidores y vulnerables a los intentos de 
represión de la producción por el Estado— hace 
que esta sea muy volátil y arriesgada. El dinero 
ilegalmente acumulado de las drogas puede 
servir como una fuente de financiación para 
las actividades económicas legales; lo que se 
hace evidente en el crecimiento económico en 
el sector formal, así mismo, hay que decir que 
este se utiliza también para financiar los grupos 
armados ilegales que contribuyen a la violencia 
y la inseguridad, en particular en contra de los 
campesinos rurales. 
Palabras clave autor
Colombia, tráfico ilícito de drogas, producción 
de cocaína, narcotráfico, narco-capital.
Palabras clave descriptor
Narcotráfico - Aspectos socioeconómicos – Co-
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tors of the economy. But while the potential for 
profits is high, the illegal nature of the industry 
means firms are prone to sabotage and violence 
from competitors and vulnerable to attempts at 
suppression of production by the state, making 
the industry highly volatile and risky. If illegally 
accumulated drug-money can serve as a source 
of financing for legal economic activities, thus 
propping up economic growth in the formal sec-
tor, it must also be said that illegally accumulated 
narco-dollars are used to finance illegal armed 
groups and contribute to violence and insecurity, 
particularly for rural peasants. 
Key words author
Colombia, illicit drugs, cocaine production, drug 
trafficking, narco-capital. 
Key words plus
Narcotic traffic - Socioeconomic aspects – Co-
lombia, Coca industry, Colombia - Economic 
policy
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Introduction
While relatively few Colombians are directly involved in narcotics production and traf-
ficking, political-economic scholarship suggests that illegal drug-industry revenues 
seep into virtually all segments of the Colombian economy. To convert large sums 
of illegally accumulated cash into bank holdings and financial capital, narco-firms 
invite popular investment in pyramid schemes, create jobs through construction and 
commercial investment, or provide opportunities for mass consumption of cheap com-
modities imports.1 Drug money has been used to finance political campaigns and set 
up private armies in the service of foreign and domestic capital accumulation.2 The 
extent of narco-infiltration into state institutions is illustrated by the growing power of 
paramilitary groups to permeate the state’s coercive apparatus,3 despite official reports 
of demobilization (The Economist, 2004, October 23, p. 53). In the countryside, rebel 
armies collect rents from coca producers and traffickers which fuel political insurgency 
by permitting rebel armies to pay for arms imports (Thoumi, 2002). Despite being seen as 
an international security problem, and despite its nefarious effects on political stability 
and domestic security, past-research has suggested that illicit drug production actually 
boosts Colombian economic growth (Pardo, 2005).
Indeed, as the global focal point for Cocaine production (but also to a lesser extent 
marijuana and opium production) Colombia is home to a large shadow economy lubri-
cated by foreign currency and impacting domestic liquidity (Arango & López, 2006). 
Understanding how forces within this shadow economy compete and/or cooperate 
with both the powerful and the marginalized within the broader context of Colombian 
capitalist accumulation is of prime importance if political-economists are to accurately 
describe how the Colombian economy fits into the contemporary global context in which 
financial capital flows are key determinants of growth and crisis. Such a task requires 
accurate quantitative data on the size of revenues generated by cocaine production and 
the amount of illegally generated drug-dollars that are available to potentially launder 
and convert into financial capital. 
Therefore, in order to supplement valuable historical, sociological and journalistic 
accounts, this paper provides some up-dated data on Colombia’s cocaine industry. First 
we ask: exactly how much annual revenue does cocaine production generate? How 
1 For a detailed treatment of this theme see Grosse (2001). 
2 An historical account of the links between cocaine traffickers and groups involved in armed conflict 
in the 1980s and early 1990s is to be found in Melo (1998).
3 A rich and dynamic historical account of the paramilitarization of the Colombian state is laid out 
in a forthcoming book by Hristov (2009).
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much of this revenue is appropriated by Colombian producers and traffickers and how 
much by non-Colombians? A review of previous attempts to estimate cocaine revenues 
reveals some inconsistent and/or partial findings, as well as some large gaps in the 
historical data record. Thus we provide our own, more recent time-series estimate of 
cocaine industry revenue based on raw UNODC data. We then use these estimates to 
compare employment, productivity, income distribution and concentration of owner-
ship within the cocaine industry to figures from the formal economy. In addition, we 
provide figures which allow us to speculate on the relative political-economic power 
of drug-lords alongside the executives of legitimate capitalist firms by comparing the 
profitability of the largest drug cartels to those of Colombia’s largest legal firms, both 
private and state-owned. Providing up-to-date empirical data on the relative importance 
of the cocaine industry to the Colombian economy provides the necessary foundations for 
the development of a theoretical framework to describe the dynamics of contemporary 
narco-capitalism. We thereby hope to advance debate among scholars and activists on 
the financial, economic, political and social impacts of underground economic activity 
on Colombian society. 
Previous research on colombian cocaine revenues
Varying laboratory techniques of producing cocaine, seasonably-variable coca crop 
yields, shifting levels of success in government-suppression and seizures, as well as 
different measurement methods on the part of scholars, are all sources of variation in 
estimates of cocaine revenues. In this section we will briefly present a sample of previ-
ous studies reporting Colombian cocaine revenues in US dollar figures. Figure 1 charts 
previous estimates of the value of the cocaine industry to Colombia in contemporary 
US dollars, not adjusted for inflation. The earliest figures we present are found in 
MacGregor (represented by a thin solid line), who estimates export values of Colombian 
cocaine rising from around 1 billion USD in 1976 to about 3,5 billion USD annually in 
the mid-1980s, peaking at around 4,5 billion USD in 1987-1989 after which point the 
series stops (MacGregor, 1993, pp. 59-60). MacGregor’s estimates are based on the 
production value of Colombian cocaine HC1 including cocaine produced in Colombia 
with Peruvian and Bolivian coca paste, discounting for seizures by government forces. 
However, MacGregor does not name the source of his data (whether it was gathered 
from newspaper accounts or provided by government agencies), nor does he mention 
whether he subtracted the value of imported Bolivian and Peruvian coca paste from the 
estimated value of Colombian cocaine exports.
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Figure 1. Some previous estimates of colombian cocaine revenues 
1977-1995
Steiner uses a complex mixture of methods to estimate the value of Colombian 
cocaine production by imputing from quantities of contraband seized by authorities, 
estimates of the extent of consumer use internationally, and the Colombian share of 
the value of wholesale distribution in the United States (1998, p. 1.027).4 His figures are 
similar to MacGregor’s only for the mid-1980s; from 1987 they are substantially lower. 
After a peak of about 4 billion USD in 1983-1984, the series spikes again in 1989 at 2,5 
billion USD, before hovering around 1,5 billion USD annually until the series stops at 
1995. In a 1997 study, Rocha provides a much more conservative minimum estimate 
of cocaine revenues at 2 billion USD in 1981, which steadily diminished to around 200 
million USD by the early 1990s.5 Additionally, Rocha provides a maximum estimate 
4 Steiner questions the validity of some academic accounts of the size of the cocaine industry which 
are based uniquely on estimates by journalists or whose authors were less than explicit about their 
methods. Steiner’s highly detailed and extensively researched account of some older studies of 
cocaine revenue in Colombia, most notably a 1990 study by esteemed Colombian political economist 
Salomon Kalmanovitz, is a must-read, so we avoid a more detailed summary here. 
5 Rocha’s 1997 data series is published in Thoumi (2003, p. 147). The original source is Rocha, 
R. (1997). Aspectos económicos de las drogas ilegales en Colombia. In Thoumi, F. (Ed.), Drogas 
ilícitas en Colombia: su impacto económico, político y social. Bogotá: Dirección Nacional de Estu-
pefacientes and United Nations Development Program, Editorial Planeta. 
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MacGregor (1993) pp 59-60.
Steiner (1998) p.1027. 
Rocha (1997) in Thoumi (2003) p.147. Cocaine Min.
Rocha (1997) in Thoumi (2003) p.147. Cocaine Max.
Our estimates using UNODC data
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that would put the mid-1980s export value on par with that of both MacGregor and 
Steiner, at around 4 billion USD in 1984, but his maximum estimates of late-1980s 
values are much higher than both MacGregor’s and Steiners’s, at over 6 billion USD 
annually between 1988 and 1990. The maximum range drops below 3 billion USD after 
1993. There is thus a great degree of variation in the existing estimates of the value of 
the cocaine industry to Colombia.
In addition to methodological and technical explanations, another reason for such 
wide variations in estimates of revenues in Colombia’s cocaine industry is the problem 
of estimating accurately how much of a share of the US wholesale market Colombians 
manage to appropriate. A substantial share of the US wholesale market would increase 
dramatically the share of global cocaine revenues appropriated by Colombian citizens 
– thereby increasing dramatically the size of Colombian cocaine revenues. For example, 
Steiner cites a 1982 study by Junguito and Caballero which he states “estimated a gross 
income for all those involved in the trade in a range of $16-28 billion, of which 1% 
went to the producer, 1,7% to the middleman in Colombia, 17,5% to the wholesaler and 
79,7% to the retailer” (Junguito & Caballero, 1982, cited in Steiner ,1998, p. 1.015). And 
in another source, (although he does not provide a time-series), Vellinga reports that 
in the 1990s, the total wholesale value of Andean cocaine could have been as much as 
8-12 billion USD, with a street value of as much as 74 billion USD (2004, p. 7). He also 
suggests that as much as half of the export value of Andean cocaine made it back to the 
producer countries, although the growing participation of Mexican, Brazilian, Venezuelan, 
US American and European traffickers is substantially reducing the Andean share. Even 
if the lion’s share of total cocaine revenues are generated, laundered and reinvested 
after further wholesaling, trafficking and retailing beyond Colombia’s borders; Vellinga 
emphasizes that, consistent with Steiner’s findings from the early 1990s, “still, income 
through the drug industry for Colombia alone has been estimated at an average of 2.5 
billion US dollars per year in the 1990s” (2004, p. 320). Unfortunately, because of the 
differing methodologies of older studies and a lack of more recent scholarship, we do 
not have an up-to-date picture of the value of Colombian cocaine revenues and therefore 
the significance of the drug industry relative to the rest of the Colombian economy. 
Methodology and data
Our estimates of cocaine revenues are based on the potential quantity of cocaine HC1 
produced in a given year imputed from estimates of the number of hectares dedicated 
to coca production and the potential yield per hectare of dry coca-leaf in the Andes.6 To 
6 Of all the clandestine cocaine labs discovered and destroyed by government authorities world-
wide, 99% of those were in Colombia, Bolivia or Peru as reported by UNODC (2007 p. 12). This 
suggests that virtually all of the world’s cocaine HCL is indeed produced in the Andes where raw 
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determine the value-added and therefore revenues available to producers or traffickers 
of a particular country of origin at each step in the production process, once we have 
data on the quantity of coca products, we will also need information on their prices. 
Our task is made somewhat straightforward thanks to the UNODC’s 2007 World Drug 
Report. According to this source, between 150.000 and 200.000 hectares of land per 
year are used to cultivate coca bush in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.7 The UNODC’s 
country-by-country hectare estimates of coca cultivation allow us to estimate coca leaf 
yield.8 Based on regional and national averages of dry coca leaf yield per hectare from 
the Bolivian, Colombian and Peruvian country reports, multiplied by the number of 
coca plants are harvested. UNODC reports that only a few tons of dry coca is produced each year 
in Ecuador. The practice was apparently abandoned by Indigenous tribes in the 1950s according 
to Leon (1952).
7 UNODC (2007b) provides estimates of global cultivation of coca bush in hectares of land use 
(1990-2006) based on satellite images and local reports. While the total land use in the three 
countries for coca cultivation in hectares remained fairly constant between 1990 and 2002, 
(around 215-225 000 ha per year) there was a significant drop in production in Peru and Bolivia 
from 1998 to 2002. This is likely due to government repression of indigenous coca cultivators in 
Bolivia, a relative decline in the power of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, as well as a blight that 
affected coca plants in that country (Vellinga, 2004, p. 5). Furthermore, the interdiction of air 
traffic in Andean air space imposed by the US Airforce interfered with small plane transports of 
coca products, see Friesendorf (2005, p. 46). At the same time, the level of global coca production 
was maintained by increased coca cultivation in Colombia after 1998. When production dropped 
in the coca supply zones in the late 1990s, Colombian cocaine manufacturers sourced domestic 
sources of raw coca leaf and base. 
However, an overall decline in world coca cultivation occurred between 2001 and 2003, likely at-
tributable to efforts to eradicate coca fields by the Uribe government as part of Plan Colombia. 
While the aerial bombardment of the countryside with thousands of tonnes of herbicide, along 
with forced manual eradication of coca crops by political prisoners, supported by US military aid, 
may be making a dent in global coca cultivation, the nefarious side effects include the eradication 
of subsistence food crops, livestock, and water supplies upon which rural peasants and indigen-
ous Colombians rely. Despite such controversial actions, since 2003, global and Colombian coca 
cultivation has remained constant with around 150 000 hectares of land planted with coca (often 
lying beyond the agricultural frontier, but also to be found in interstitial spaces between fields of 
legitimate crops well within the agricultural heartland of Colombia). The geographic and political-
economic dimensions of Andean coca cultivation are to be the subject of forthcoming work by 
the author, particularly the repercussions to Colombia’s banking system following the shift of coca 
production toward Colombia from Peru and Bolivia in the late 1990s. 
8 Variations in estimates at this stage are due to in Thoumi’s view to “the type of coca plants and 
their age; weather conditions; coca plant density per hectare; the amount and types of fertilizers 
and herbicides used; the frequency of pruning; the skills of chemists and the type and quality of 
the chemicals used; and the time between the moment leaves are harvested and the actual refin-
ing process begins” (2003, p. 142). There is then, a great room for error in any estimate of coca 
yield extrapolated from hectare estimates of coca cultivation. 
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hectares in cultivation, the UNODC has estimated a total yearly quantity of dry coca 
leaf produced in the Andes (broken down by country). From around 100.000 mt of dry 
coca leaves per year in 1980, throughout the 1980s production increased steadily. Since 
1990, between 300.000 and 350.000 mt of dry coca leaves have been produced each 
year in the Andes region.9 Using scientific estimates of coca yields per hectare, multiplied 
by hectares of coca cultivated, multiplied by factors representing the quantity of coca 
paste, cocaine base and finally cocaine HC1 that can be refined per unit of coca leaf, the 
UNODC has provided estimates of quantities of potential cocaine HC1 production for 
each of the Andean countries between 1990 and 2007. Despite government suppression 
through eradication efforts, due to improvements in crop rotation techniques, fertilizer 
use, improved refinement techniques and favourable growing conditions that make per 
hectare yields higher, total Colombian cocaine output has consistently increased since 
the early 1990s and indeed remains around year 2.000 levels of 600 metric tonnes per 
year. Figure 2 presents in graphic form the UN data on potential cocaine production, 
alongside which we have included data on government seizures. The chart demonstrates 
that while production levels are growing, so is the rate of success of international au-
thorities’ suppression of the cocaine trade.
Figure 2. Potential world production of cocaine HC1 in metric 
tonnes by country of origin 1990-2007
Source: UNODC (2007b, p. 64; 2008, pp.66-81). Seizures data from www.unodc.org
9 For data see UNODC (2000a, p. 40; 2000b, p. 24) 
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What potential cocaine output per Andean country provides us with is an estimate 
of the quantity of cocaine HC1 that would be produced in each country if all of its coca 
products were to be refined there. However, we cannot determine exactly the share of 
cocaine revenues attributable to any given country due to transnationalized production 
and refinement of coca products. As Thoumi puts it, we cannot know precisely “the 
share of the Bolivian and Peruvian paste and base that is controlled and internationally 
marketed by Bolivians, Colombians and Peruvians; and the share of each country’s traf-
fickers in the value added generated by smuggling drugs within the Andean countries 
and outside the region” (2003, p. 143). This problem is akin to trying to determine which 
share of revenues from one firm’s automobile production and sales should be attributed 
to each country’s GDP when the tires are produced in Japan, the electrical components 
in China, the parts in Canada and the body assembled in Detroit. Likewise, cocaine 
production involves transnational linkages. According to Grosse, “the basic business of 
drug trafficking in Colombia involves purchasing and transporting the coca leaf and/
or cocaine base from growing regions in Peru and Bolivia, as well as domestically, and 
manufacturing cocaine hydrochloride in Colombia” (2001, p. 172). To calculate revenues 
from this business, then, we must have estimates for quantities and prices of coca prod-
ucts (leaf, paste or base) imported into Colombia to subtract from the export value of 
finished cocaine products leaving the country (i.e. cocaine HC1). This means that “two 
price series are required: that at which Colombians purchase base from Bolivia and 
Peru and the one Colombians obtain from their sales in consumer markets” (Steiner, 
1998, p. 1.021). We can impute revenues appropriated by producers and traffickers in 
particular regions if we make our assumptions clear about where particular stages in 
the production process occur and hence where value is added. 
While we have quantity of production estimates from 1987 onwards for Peru, Bolivia 
and Colombia, we only have complete factor-pricing and value-added estimates for all 
stages of the cocaine production process for Colombia, and only for the year 2005 (UN-
ODC, 2006, p. 49). Thus we will use these values as proxies in order to construct price 
series from which we can impute revenues from the Andean drugs business dating back 
to 1991. As we can see from estimates offered by UNODC in Table 1, if dry coca leaf sells 
for 1 USD per kilo, at an average annual yield of 6.300 kg/ha, a farmer could generate 
6.300 USD per hectare of coca planted. However, once those leaves are transformed 
into coca paste, the price rises to 879 USD per kg. If 10,2 kg of coca paste are yielded 
per hectare of planted coca, the annual revenue per hectare planted generated from the 
sale of coca paste becomes 8.966 USD, for a gain of 44% over the value of dry coca leaf. 
Combine this gain with the convenience of transporting a much lighter product, there 
is incentive for primary producers to grow and process coca leaves into paste at the site 
of production. If the farmer has the resources to process paste into cocaine base, there 
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is a 57% per unit gain in revenue (value-added), which rises to over 107% for those who 
can produce the finished cocaine HC1. 
Table 1. Potential annual income per ha of coca cultivation for 
different coca leaf products
Derivative Annual Yield kg/ha
Avg. Annual 
Price US$/kg
Annual Inco-
me in US$/ha
Value added 
from coca leaf
coca leaf 6300 1 6300
coca paste 10.2 879 8966 44%
cocaine base 9.5 1038 9861 57%
Cocaine hydrochloride 7.4 1762 13039 107%
Source: DIRAN in UNODC (2006, p. 49).
Whether farmer or renegade chemist, based on 2005 data from Colombia, we can 
state that whoever can turn the coca leaf into pure crystal winds up with a product that 
is worth twice as much as a field of dry coca leaves (13.039 USD versus 6.300 USD) and 
weights almost a thousand times less (6.300 kg versus 7,4 kilos), making transporta-
tion of the product more cost-effective and more difficult to detect, reducing some of 
the risk. However, due to the high costs and local scarcity of materials necessary for 
refinement (such as acid or acetone), it is unlikely that small-scale farmers could afford 
to refine their dry-leaves beyond the paste-stage. Since they have access to the expertise 
and resources, large drug-cartels can make use of economies of scale to perform more 
cost-effectively the transformation of coca paste to cocaine base to cocaine HC1. Thus 
we will suppose that all of the world’s finished cocaine HC1 is produced in Colombia, 
but it is produced using a combination of Colombian, Peruvian and Bolivian paste (and 
not cocaine base).10 We also know that Colombia rather than Peru or Bolivia has been 
the primary centre of cocaine HC1 manufacture since the 1970s even if paste and base 
are imported from these other Andean countries,11 so historical evidence and economic 
rationale support our assumption. 
10 Which is consistent with Steiner (1998, p. 1.026)
11 Colombian traffickers were already established as marijuana exporters before commercializing 
for mass consumption the traditional Andean coca leaf, by importing coca products from traditional 
growing areas elsewhere for manufacture in Colombia. See Melo (1998).
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Figure 3. Colombian wholesale prices of cocaine HC1 in current COP 
and current USD 1991-2007
Source: UNODC (2006, p. 49; 2008, p. 237) 
In any case, the available data makes our methodological choices for us: we do have a 
time series of Colombian wholesale prices in USD and COP for cocaine HC1 for 1991-2007 
(see Figure 3); and we do have wholesale prices for Bolivian and Peruvian coca leaf for 
(1991-2007). From this latter series we can estimate the value of coca paste imports from 
those countries using the average of 44% mark-up per unit price from the Colombian 
data (UNODC, 2006, p. 49). Thus we calculated the value of coca paste imports into 
Colombia by multiplying by a factor of 1,44 the unit cost of dry coca leaves at Peruvian 
and Bolivian market prices.12 This of course assumes, once again, that it is far more likely 
that paste is imported to Colombia from the other Andean producers and not dry leaves 
considering their price to volume ratio as noted above. Finally, we calculated the value of 
Colombian cocaine revenues by multiplying the total potential Andean cocaine yield in 
tonnes by 1.000, multiplied by the current Colombian wholesale market price per kilo 
of cocaine HC1. This gave us an estimated total value of Andean cocaine production 
from 1991-2007 in USD. We then subtracted the value of Peruvian and Bolivian coca 
paste imports (price times quantity of coca leaf times 1,44). In addition to subtracting 
12 Because we are forced to use Colombian value-added estimates for the transformation from coca 
leaf to coca paste on Peruvian and Bolivian quantity estimates, we encounter a methodological 
problem. This ratio may not apply to Bolivian and Peruvian paste due to regional differences in 
leaf opiate concentrations and differences in refinement techniques and materials. Further, using 
the 2005 data on leaf to paste value added is problematic due to the likelihood of yearly variations 
in production yields and local factor prices. As such, our estimates of Bolivian and Peruvian coca 
products imported to Colombia can only be a proxy. 
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the price of Peruvian and Bolivian imports from Colombia’s gross cocaine revenues, we 
also subtracted the value of government seizures of cocaine HC1.13
Thus:
Colombian Cocaine HC1 revenues
Equals: Total Andean Cocaine Production (quantity in kg * Colombian wholesale 
price)
Minus: Peruvian coca paste imports (coca leaf price per kg * quantity * 1.44) 
Minus: Bolivian coca paste imports (coca leaf price per kg* quantity * 1.44)
Minus: Colombian Government Seizures (quantity*Colombian wholesale price). 
The resulting data-series is of the total value of annual revenues in Colombia’s cocaine 
industry at Colombian wholesale prices industry from 1991-2007. 
Results
Cocaine revenues that can be attributed to Colombian producers and traffickers fluctuate 
between 600 million USD to 1,2 billion USD, depending on annual yields, confiscations, 
factor prices (including the cost of imported Andean coca products), and the success of 
eradication programs. In fact, revenues fluctuate so drastically from year to year that 
the industry can only be characterized as extremely volatile and risky as a business sec-
tor, even if one puts aside the additional risks posed by competitors with a penchant to 
use violence and state authorities looking to suppress the entire industry. We display 
our findings in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Colombia cocaine revenues in current USD millions  
1991-2007
Source data: UNODC (2007b; 2008) 
13 Quantities of Drugs seized were obtained from the UNODC’s website at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/organized-crime/bi-annual-seizure-reports.html.
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In terms of the validity of our findings, we can see from Figure 1 that our findings 
fall within the general range of estimates on Colombian cocaine revenues. The early 
part of our series is consistent with Steiner’s findings and falls midway between Rocha’s 
minimum and maximum thresholds. However, since we calculated the revenues likely 
attributable to Colombian producers at Colombian wholesale prices (not at US whole-
sale prices), our estimates of revenues from the cocaine industry can be considered low 
compared to some previous findings from the early 1990s. 
However, if we were to take into account the share of profits accrued to Colombi-
ans involved in trafficking cocaine beyond Colombian territory, Colombians’ cocaine 
revenues would increase since the action of transporting cocaine across international 
boundaries alone increases dramatically the value-added of cocaine HC1.14 We will not 
speculate on exactly how much Colombians appropriate of the global trafficking revenues 
or the global wholesale market. But we can get an idea of the revenues up for grabs from 
cocaine trafficking beyond the Andean producer countries. We calculated global cocaine 
revenues broken down into shares accrued to producers, traffickers and retailers based 
on Colombian and US American wholesale prices, and US retail prices, subtracting 
of course the quantity of global seizures from data obtained from UNODC. Since we 
already have the share of production revenues in the Andean data, we calculated traf-
fickers’ revenues using US wholesale prices per kilo from 1991 to 2005 using data from 
the UNODC World Drug Report, 2007 & 2008. Further, we calculated the additional 
value added of street level retail sales in USD per gram in order to estimate the global 
revenues of retailers (street-level dealers). These estimates might be low-balled as the 
growing Eastern European market dictates that cocaine sells for more in Europe than 
in the United States, however we use the US retail prices as we have no way of dividing 
up the share of the global Cocaine product accurately by country or region. We present 
our findings in Figure 5.
14 As Thoumi (2003, p. 149) and Steiner (1998, p. 1.021), both point out, it is difficult to estimate 
how much of profits generated through wholesale and retail cocaine sales in consumer countries 
are appropriated by Colombians as opposed to foreign traffickers and dealers since it is unclear 
when and where in the distribution chain sales take place and at what wholesale prices, those of 
Colombia or those of the receiving country. 
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Figure 5. World cocaine industry total revenue by sector based on 
current yearly average prices 1991-2007
Sources: UNODC (2007b, p. 228; 2006, p. 45; 2008, p. 260). 
We can see from Figure 5 that the global revenues from the cocaine industry have 
been in decline for traffickers and retailers. With governments seizing an increasing 
share of the product at border stings or in raids, overall profits are diminishing and the 
industry would appear to be getting more dangerous for participants risking jail-time or 
violent death at the hands of competing firms. Further, as other drugs such as ecstasy, 
Crystal Meth, heroine, and marijuana become cheaper and more readily available, the 
American street value of cocaine HC1 is in decline. While the gross retail value of cocaine 
still suggests massive global revenues, in the range of 20 to 40 billion USD annually, 
profits are widely distributed among a great number of street-level retailers and regional 
traffickers. And as we are going to see, since the control over cocaine production and 
export in Colombia is concentrated, far fewer players share in the revenue pie, making 
the potential for huge profits extremely high. And, if our findings are accurate, despite 
yearly fluctuations, the production value of Colombian cocaine has remained fairly 
constant (on average) since the early 1990s. 
Discussion: the cocaine industry & the colombian economy
Our goal from the outset of this paper has been to provide some empirical grounding 
upon which to construct a theoretical framework that places the underground economy 
within the overall context of Colombian political economy. Because the cocaine in-
dustry is part of the underground economy, revenues from production are not directly 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
U
S$
 B
ill
io
ns
Year
Producers Share 
(Colombian Wholesale 
Price)
Traffickers Share (US 
Wholesale Price)
Dealers Share (US 
Retail Price)
95T h e  P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  o f  C o l o m b i a ’ s  C o c a i n e  I n d u s t r y
Pap. Polít. Bogotá (Colombia), Vol. 14, No. 1, 81-106, enero-junio 209
accounted for in calculations of the country’s gross domestic product. Nevertheless, 
since a portion of revenues are laundered, banked and either directly invested in other 
sectors such as construction or real-estate, or reinvested in the stock market, joining 
global financial circuits, cocaine revenues eventually show up in the national accounts, 
listed as other sources of revenue. Pin-pointing exactly where cocaine money turns up 
in the formal economy is perhaps impossible, and certainly we will not attempt it here. 
But we can use our findings from the previous sections to provide a sketch of the rela-
tive size, productivity, profitability, and level of concentration and power in the cocaine 
industry compared to the rest of the Colombian economy. 
By our calculations, cocaine revenues were worth between 600 million USD and 
1,2 billion USD to Colombia alone each year from the early 1990s to 2007. In relative 
terms, how does this value compare to other sources of revenue for the Colombian 
economy? In Figure 6 we plotted our estimate of cocaine revenues as a percentage of 
GDP using current US dollar figures obtained from the World Bank. Cocaine revenues 
hovered around 1 % of GDP throughout the 1990s with a high of 1,61% of GDP in 1991, 
dropping to a low of 0,56 % of GDP in 1995 and peaking again at 1,38% of GDP in 1999. 
Since 1999, there has been a gradual decline in the relative importance of the cocaine 
industry to the over-all economy as over-all growth intensified while cocaine revenues 
remained on the average stable (if volatile). 
Figure 6. Cocaine revenue, agricultural value-added and industry 
value-added as % of GDP (based on current US$ value 1991-2007)
Source: World Bank (2008)
We also plotted Industry value-added as a percentage of GDP in Figure 6. Industry 
(including manufacturing and extractive industries) as a percentage of GDP dropped 
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from around 37% in 1991 to a low of 28% in 1998-1999, gradually rising again to about 
35% of GDP by 2006 (before dropping off again in 2007). Further, value-added from 
agriculture, also plotted in Figure 6, declined from around 15% of GDP in the 1990s to 
11% by 2007. While in absolute terms, the cocaine industry amounts to only a small 
portion of Colombian productivity, considering it is concerned with the production of 
just one type of commodity (and an illegal one at that), it is significant. Further, despite 
large yearly fluctuations, the value of cocaine production as a share of GDP has remained 
fairly constant on average since the early 1990s while agriculture is in decline and in-
dustrial output prone to long cycles. While this is likely due to an overall intensification 
of economic growth due to a rise in productivity in the service sectors and in resource 
extraction more than an absolute decline in agricultural productivity, it does point to 
the consistency and resilience of the cocaine industry. Despite being illegal, facing the 
efforts of the international security system to suppress it, and taking place within the 
terrain of battle between armed factions, the cocaine industry continues to persevere 
and produce significant revenues. 
In Figure 7 we present the value of revenue in the cocaine industry as a percentage 
of revenue in both agriculture and industry. Cocaine production equals on average 
around 8% of agricultural value added (with a high of 10% in 1999 and a low of 4% in 
1995). Cocaine production would be worth around 3% of value-added from industry to 
the Colombian economy in the average year between 1991 and 2007, with a low of 2% 
in 1995 and a high of 5% in 1999. Nevertheless, eyeball analysis of the long-term trends 
suggests that cocaine production is becoming less important as the formal economy 
grows considering that cocaine production has been less than 1% of GDP every year since 
2002. But in absolute terms, the fact that just one product, cocaine HC1, could account 
for the equivalent of 8% of agricultural output and 3% of industrial output suggests the 
enormous size and profitability of this sector of the shadow economy. 
Further, in considering the productivity of the cocaine industry, it is important to 
sketch out employment patterns and wealth distribution within this sector of the shadow 
economy. Estimates of the numbers of people employed in the cocaine industry vary 
widely, on the one hand due to the insecure nature of working conditions in this illegal 
industry which employs many migrant and seasonal workers in precarious and often 
dangerous conditions, but also due to difficulties in accurately measuring illegal activ-
ity. According to estimates made by the Colombian government and UNODC, there 
are perhaps 68.000 households that rely primarily on coca cultivation as a source of 
income (2006, p. 6).15 Grosse characterizes the class structure and division of labour 
15 Estimating that producers who grew coca likely made paste out of leaves before selling them, the 
UNODC puts household coca growing income at around 843 million USD in 2005 and 683 million 
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Figure 7. Cocaine revenue as % of GDP, agriculture value-added 
and industrial value-added 1991-2007
Source: World Bank (2008)
within the cocaine industry as a pyramid at the top of which rest 10 core organizations 
(Grosse, 2001, p. 174). These are what we typically call cartels, really crime syndicates 
that pool their resources in order to improve the efficiency of production, distribution 
and protection.16 Grosse estimates that in all, these core firms would employ around 500 
people. Below these firms in the hierarchy are a number of smaller but more numerous 
(around 100 or so) specialized firms providing transportation services, money launder-
ing, protection and enforcement of contracts, and laboratory operations. Below these 
USD in 2006. If these figures are accurate, the report goes on to estimate that the coca household 
share of cocaine revenues would be at around 12 300 USD and 10 100 USD respectively for 2005 
and 2006 (2006), putting the coca growing peasant substantially better off in purely economic 
terms than the average Colombian who could expect just over 2000 USD GDP per capita in 2005. 
This estimate puts the share of production given to primary producers close to our total estimate 
of Colombian cocaine revenue and suggests that the authors ignored concentration of control over 
trafficking and the use of power and coercion in the distribution of revenues. Simply calculating the 
value of the crop and dividing it by the estimated number of total producers does not necessarily 
give an accurate picture of average cocaine revenue earned by the producer; the UN estimate 
does not take into account class hierarchies based on the division of labour between producer and 
trafficker, nor the insecurity of person and property due to a concentration of power and control 
over the productive process by an armed and violent few. Thus, beyond bare-faced economic 
estimates of well-being based on income, the UN estimate ignores the reality of the coca producing 
peasant who, while waiting to sell the product of their labour to heavily armed and dangerous 
narco-trafficers, is at risk of expropriation and attack by government forces, of exploitation at the 
hands of armed paramilitaries and open to extortion from rent-seeking guerrillas.
16 For a discussion of the way cartels operate, see Thoumi (2002, p. 108).
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would be perhaps another 1.000 freelance workers with varying skills including pilots, 
chemists, financial advisors, brokers, assassins, lawyers, accountants and paramilitary 
commanders. Below that would be another 1.000 part-time workers performing various 
tasks such as security, running messages and packages, doing surveillance, operating 
radio and telecommunications equipment, operating machinery, performing manual 
labour, and working as smurfs (those who break down large amounts of cash into 
smaller bundles that can be deposited in bank accounts). Finally, there are the 100.000 
to 135.000 coca growers, agricultural workers and primary producers at the base of 
Grosse’s pyramid (2001, p. 174). 
In a country of 44 million people, then, between 0,2 and 0,3% of the population pro-
duces the equivalent of 1 to 1,5% of the country’s total production, all of it unaccounted 
for by the institutions that control the formal economy, leaving it untaxed, un-regulated 
and often expropriated by both legal and extra-legal force. Now, consider that in 2005, 
22% of Colombian workers were employed in agriculture, producing only 12,5% of GDP 
according to World Bank’s Development Indicators. Further, within the industry wealth 
and power are highly concentrated. Consider that a handful of strong-men sit atop a 
rigid hierarchy of perhaps 500 to 2.500 employees, who, after having bought the factors 
of production and paid the primary producers of coca paste and cocaine base can then 
manufacture and export a product that generates them revenues worth at least twice 
what they paid for the inputs. If the 100.000 or so primary producers took in half of 
Colombian cocaine revenue (based on estimates of value added in the production process 
presented above), then that leaves still between 0,5 and 1% of their country’s GDP to the 
traffickers. Even if there were 10 big cartels employing 2.500 people, that would mean 
that 25.000 people, or 0,05% of Colombia’s population would earn the equivalent of 
0,5 to 1% of its GDP in just one sector of the shadow economy. This figure would likely 
be much larger considering the potential for a larger Colombian share in the overseas 
wholesale cocaine market than we are assuming here, not to mention further revenues 
from investments of laundered money in other sectors such as construction, real-estate, 
retail goods imports, and entertainment.
In terms of productivity (revenue generated per worker), then, the cocaine industry is 
highly profitable but also highly risky for producer and trafficker. Nevertheless, despite 
the risks, because of the exclusion of many rural workers from opportunities within the 
formal economy on the one hand, and the exploitation of cheap labour within the formal 
economy on the other, many peasants continue to be driven into coca production, and 
urban youth continue to seek employment with drug-cartels. 
What does it mean for the Colombian economy that there would be a highly profitable 
illegal industry overwhich control is highly concentrated in the hands of a small segment 
of the population. How does the quantity of wealth controlled by drug-firms compare to 
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other large sums of money in the economy. How does this effect the economy at large? 
The answers to this question are suggested by another comparison. The cocaine industry 
is so big that in the early 1990s it represented more than half of the value of net direct 
foreign investment in the country. As we can see in Figure 8, while foreign investment 
rose substantially during the first years of Plan Colombia, and more recently as the 
government has continued to welcome investment by multinational corporations, if FDI 
is any benchmark, the cocaine industry still remains an important potential source of 
finance for economic development.17
Figure 8. Cocaine revenue and net foreign direct investment  
as a % of GDP 1991-2005
Source: World Bank (2008)
So big perhaps is the cocaine industry, that it might actually boost over-all economic 
growth. Indeed, this is the point made by Camila Pardo in a 2005 article suggesting a posi-
tive relationship between growth in narcotics production and economic growth in the 
Colombian economy.18 Not only does it appear that increased illicit drug production 
correlates with economic growth, but solely in terms of economic growth figures, the 
17 According to UNODC Secretary-General Antonio María Costa, speaking with Austrian news 
magazine Profil during the current financial crisis illicit drug money has become one of the only 
available sources of liquid investment capital, and that there is evidence that interbank loans have 
been financed with capital derived from drug trafficking and other illegal activities, even to the point 
where Costa surmises that some banks have been saved from bankruptcy in this manner way. In 
Profil (2009) (Thanks to Julian Germann for pointing out and translating this reference). 
18 Pardo does not provide specific dollar estimates for illicit drug production revenues. Instead she 
measures narcotics production based on hectares of land used to cultivate illicit crops (coca and 
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economy also benefits from foreign aid aimed at addressing the problem (even despite 
the negative effects of political instability) (2005, p. 464). The implications are rather 
astounding: indeed, while illicit drug trafficking is seen by most governments as a 
source of instability in the international system, the inconvenient reality is that a small 
but powerful elite manages to benefit from narco-capital accumulation both directly, 
as it provides a direct source of liquid investment to finance the business activities of 
domestic and multinational corporations in control of Colombian capital accumulation; 
and indirectly, as the continuation and persistence of narco-production and trafficking 
strengthens the resolve of international policy-makers (particularly those in the United 
States) and ensures that they provide a steady flow of international military aid into the 
coffers of the Colombian armed forces. 
Power and capital accumulation in the cocaine industry
We will finish off this paper by using our findings to speculate on the relative power of 
Colombian cocaine firms within the context of Colombian capitalism. Political economists 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler have developed a measurable concept of political 
power within modern capitalist economies based largely on Israeli and US American data. 
The most powerful firms operating within the core sectors of the economy are those that 
consistently post profits better than the average of their competitors. The executives of 
dominant firms are able to exercise power in their societies not simply because of their 
net worth in absolute terms, but rather in their relative share of the economic pie within 
their sector and within their society. Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of differential accumu-
lation measures the growth rate of a particular firm within an industry, or a particular 
industry within the wider economy as a whole, in relation to the average growth rate 
of a firm or of the economy as a whole (2002, pp. 171-174). If a firm can grow outwards 
(by expanding into green-field sectors of the economy) or intensify production inwards 
(by increasing productivity per employee) at a faster rate relative to its competitors, it 
can be said to be more powerful and influential in the economy as a whole, enabling its 
executives to enhance their share of social power in society at large. 
We have already seen that the cocaine industry is productive in terms of output per 
worker, and is likely to be highly profitable for firms that survivie, creating the potential 
to accumulate huge sums of money that can be invested as financial capital within the 
banking system. If we consider, as Nitzan and Bichler put it, that “modern capital is 
finance and only finance” (2002, p. 36) any firm able to bank and then invest large sums 
of financial capital can count themselves among the core of the dominant capitalist class. 
marijuana) and finds a positive relationship between this variable and GDP growth from 1994-2002. 
In particular, see 2005 (pp. 460-461, 417-476). 
101T h e  P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  o f  C o l o m b i a ’ s  C o c a i n e  I n d u s t r y
Pap. Polít. Bogotá (Colombia), Vol. 14, No. 1, 81-106, enero-junio 209
Thus, once drug firms manage to launder their money and convert it into bank holdings, 
they would be perfectly capable of controlling “legitimate” investments within the wider 
economy worth a substantial portion of the country’s bank holdings, or they would be 
capable of controlling investment funds as large as those of many institutional holdings or 
pension funds. The laundering and banking, that is, the financialization of accumulated 
drug profits then, would give drug barons great potential to take “a share of control over 
the social process,” as Nitzan and Bichler put it (2002, p. 36). In other words, it would 
make them very powerful players in Colombian society. Financialization occurs either 
through the Colombian banking system or through foreign banks. Once legally banked, 
illegally accumulated financial capital could be invested anywhere in the world. Drug 
lords, insofar as they can launder and bank their money, are really narco-capitalists. 
As Thoumi remarks, “Drug traffickers are good capitalists, and illicit drug capital flows 
behave in a way similar to any other international capital flow: they are influenced by 
macroeconomic conditions in the Andean countries, the United States, and other coun-
tries, as well as by fiscal and monetary policies” (2003, pp.145-146). While we cannot 
measure directly the power in terms of capital holdings and differential accumulation 
of any particular drug cartel in Colombia, as we have no way of opening up the books 
and obtaining exact annual revenues per firm, nor estimating the total capital holdings 
of illegal firms, we can still apply Bichler and Nitzan’s reasoning to roughly measure the 
potential power of Colombia’s cocaine elite relative to the most powerful legal firms in 
Colombia’s economy. This will involve a thumbnail sketch of the revenues of cocaine 
firms relative to the market value of large legal firms. 
Let us say, following Grosse (2001, p. 174), that 10 core firms sit atop the cocaine 
industry which brought in revenues of 856 million USD in 2005. Even after paying half 
of these revenues to primary producers for production costs, that leaves over 400 mil-
lion USD in annual net revenue to be divided among them (assuming that there are no 
further costs and having already subtracted government confiscations). Financial Times 
of London data reports that in 2005, Ecopetrol’s net income was 3’253.756 millions 
COP, or 1,4 billion USD at 2005 exchange rates (2009, Feb. 10). Bancolombia’s 2005 
net income was 409 million USD (2009, Feb. 10). While Bavaria S.A beverage group had 
total revenues of over 2,2 billion USD, after taking into account operating expenses and 
taxes, net income was only 34,6 million USD (2009, Feb. 10). These firms are the only 
Colombian firms to make it onto the Financial Times Top 100 firms in Latin America in 
2005. Considering that one of the core cocaine firms could potentially take in 40 million 
USD net income in a given year, cocaine firms would rank high among Colombia’s most 
profitable corporations. And if a dedicated and prudent narco-capitalist could manage 
to clean and bank a good share of his fortune, he could translate illegally accumulated 
narco-wealth into a substantial sum of capital. Thus narco-capitalists, should they suc-
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ceed in cleaning up their illegally accumulated fortunes, could potentially be among the 
most powerful members of Colombian society, if indeed, as Nitzan and Bichler put it, 
capital is finance and finance easily translates into social power. 
But what about the dynamics of narco-capital accumulation in relation to the wider 
Colombian economy; how does narco-capitalist accumulation perform relative to the 
rest of the Colombian economy over time? As noted above, Nitzan and Bichler’s concept 
of differential accumulation could be used to measure the performance of a particular 
industry compared to some measure of the economy as a whole (2002, pp. 171-174). 
And so, we compared the growth-rate of the Cocaine industry expressed as an annual 
percentage change in total revenues with Colombian GDP annual percentage growth. 
While generally the cocaine industry has the potential to grow dramatically year by year, 
it also can shrink drastically, due to government seizures, crop failure, sabotage on the 
part of competitors, input shortages, labour shortages, etc. As we can see from Figure 9, 
in the 1990s, growth rates were dramatically higher in the cocaine industry than in the 
economy as a whole, except for the years 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998, when huge declines 
in output put growth in the cocaine industry well below that of the formal economy. After 
1999, growth in the cocaine industry fell far below growth in the formal economy in all 
but two years, 2004 and 2007. Once again, while cocaine can still be wildly profitable 
and empower a small group of people, as a productive sector it is prone to volatility and 
exposes narco-capitalists and workers to extremely high levels of risk.
Figure 9. Differential accumulation in colombian cocaine industry
Data source: Worldbank (2008) and author’s calculations from UNODC data.
Even if narco-capitalists do not succeed in turning illegally accumulated drug profits 
into licit financial holdings, their power over the future of Colombian society can be exert-
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ed in other ways. As the political adventures of Pablo Escobar and his contemporaries,19 
as well as recent allegations of drug-money being used to fund political campaigns at-
test, drug revenue that does not get laundered and legitimized as financial capital still 
allows drug-lords to exert extraordinary influence over the formal political system and 
governmental institutions through cash payments of bribes to corrupt politicians, police, 
military officials and judges. Further, illegally accumulated drug revenue that it is not 
legitimized and reinvested in the formal sector can still be reinvested back in the cocaine 
industry itself, or in some other sector of the underground economy which operates on 
the basis of cash payments. Thus Drug-cash is used to open up further coca production 
and cocaine manufacturing which spins-off into investment in materials, workers, and 
armed protection. Drug money has provided the means through which various business 
interests can foot armies, either to protect the interests of landed capital as in the case 
of paramilitary armies, or to fund private mercenary armies for hire to domestic and 
foreign capitalist firms (Melo, 1998, pp.79-81). This creates insecurity, social instability 
and drives mass displacement out of the countryside into urban centres. According to 
Melo, drugs money has also been cited by many politicians and observers as the means 
through which the FARC and ELN continue to stage their existing political struggles through 
violent means, thus suggesting that drugs-money fuels armed conflict in the country on 
either sides of the political spectrum.20
Conclusion
We can conclude that while the cocaine industry is a risky business, it is also highly pro-
ductive in terms of output per worker if agricultural output and industrial value-added 
serve as benchmarks. Nevertheless, the relative importance of the cocaine industry to 
the Colombian economy as a whole appears to be in decline, as GDP growth suggests 
productivity increases in manufacturing and industry (particularly the extractive resource 
sectors) and foreign investment is on the rise. However, this could change if the cocaine 
industry has a few more highly productive years, and given the volatility of the sector, this 
is possible. This illegal sector of the economy has the potential to be highly profitable for 
those willing to take the risk and success in this sector can endow narco-capitalists with 
extraordinary (and extra-legal) powers. As Steiner puts it: “Even if the true economic 
dimension of drugs in Colombia is smaller than what is generally suggested both in the 
press and in political circles within the United States, it is still the case that the drug trade 
provides resources to a very small group of outlaws, with enormous power to corrupt 
19 On drug cartels involvement in institutionalized politics in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s see 
Melo (1998, pp. 68-77) 
20 However, according to Melo, the relationship between coca production and guerrilla insurgency 
is complex and requires further investigation (1998, pp. 80-82)
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the country’s social and political fabric” (1998, p. 1.013). In this paper we have tried to 
put a dollar value on the capacity of powerful illegal capitalists to finance Colombian 
financial capital accumulation and corrupt the institutions of the state. 
Now that we have the empirical foundations for a framework in which to theorize the 
place of the cocaine industry within the wider context of Colombian capitalism, a number 
of lines of investigation open up. What remains to be done through further empirical 
work is to investigate in more detail the ways in which the highly profitable but highly 
dangerous cocaine industry interacts with Colombia’s formal economy. For example, to 
what extent does expansion of illicit drug production use arable land that could other-
wise be used for the production of legal crops?21 The relationship between agricultural 
land-tenure, colonization, expansion of the agricultural zone, forced rural displacement, 
agro-capitalist development and the coca industry requires sustained scholarly atten-
tion. Who are the primary producers of coca crops? Are they predominantly displaced 
rural peasants colonizing new land, or are they small tenured land-holding peasants, 
or migrant workers contracted by narco-capitalist firms seasonally to pick leaves? To 
what extent is land seized by illegal armed groups turned over to coca cultivation? How 
does illegal drug production feed into the process of accumulation of land and property 
for the larger process of expansion of agro-capitalist production? 
From further empirical work on questions such as these we can begin to accurately 
theorize how the illicit economy creates opportunities for those marginalized by Colom-
bian capitalism, how it allows criminals to compete with institutionalized power brokers, 
and how cooperation between illicit capital and some elements within the Colombian 
state corrupts both state and society at large. This will involve further quantitative work 
on differential accumulation within the Colombian economy to better tease out the net 
economic impacts of the cocaine industry on Colombian capitalism; however, it will also 
involve an historical sociological investigation into the social forces (including a predatory 
global capitalism) that drive Colombians into the cocaine industry in the first place. 
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